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 1 
Market Responses to Firms’ Voluntary Carbon Disclosure: Empirical Evidence from 1 
the United Kingdom           2 
Amount of words 9716 3 
Abstract 4 
In corporate boardrooms around the world, climate change has quickly risen to become a major 5 
issue, matching public concern. Recently, corporate management has encountered stakeholder 6 
pressure to disclose more information about their carbon profile and their plans to improve it. 7 
They have also been challenged to find the appropriate strategy for carbon disclosures, 8 
requiring an understanding of the costs and benefits of both carbon improvement initiatives 9 
and the reporting of them. 10 
Using a unique data set that contains firms listed on the FTSE 350 index on the London Stock 11 
Exchange market from 2009 to 2015, we apply the event study method to examine market 12 
reaction to carbon disclosures. The results show that investors respond significantly negatively 13 
to carbon disclosure announcements via Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) of FTSE 350 firms. 14 
Moreover, for firms working in carbon-intensive industries, investors react to carbon disclosure 15 
announcements in a more significantly negative way compared with the main sample. We also 16 
find that the study’s main findings are driven by the smaller FTSE 350 firms. Furthermore, a 17 
subsample of observations for the financial crisis period of 2007-2008 was analyzed to explore 18 
the examined relationship during the crisis. In contrast, a significant positive market reaction 19 
to carbon disclosure was found for the 2007-2008 crisis period. Our study’s findings offer fresh 20 
insight and updated policy implications for investors, management and sustainability 21 
institutions. We recommend management accompanies their carbon disclosures with more 22 
explicit statements of reasons for carbon initiatives and the benefits arising from them.  23 
 24 
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• Voluntary carbon disclosures are deemed by investors to have a negative value. 34 
• Firms operating in carbon-intensive industries experience a more pronounced 35 
negative reaction on voluntary carbon disclosure. 36 
• Analysis indicates that the main findings are driven by smaller FTSE 350 firms. 37 
• The negative effect of voluntary carbon disclosure was reversed for the 2007/8 period 38 







1. Introduction 45 
Climate change has emerged as a significant business consideration over the last two decades 46 
(Mardani et al., 2019). Firms have increasingly included consideration of global warming  in 47 
their strategic management decision making (e.g. Alsaifi et al., 2019; Matsumura et al., 2014) 48 
and have adopted a range of environmental strategies (Radu et al, 2020). In recent years, 49 
businesses have experienced increasing pressure to disclose more information about their 50 
plans to lower their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and their overall climate change 51 
strategy. Globally, stakeholders and public interest groups have called for greater disclosure, 52 
increased transparency, and a consistent approach to GHG emissions (e.g. Flammer, 2013; 53 
Qian and Schaltegger, 2017). Meanwhile, firms and their insurers have expressed concerns 54 
over the cost of these disclosures from the viewpoint of liability exposure and competitive 55 
disadvantage (Weigand, 2010). Additionally, there are individuals who urge balancing the 56 
approach by considering both costs and benefits (e.g. Li et al., 1997). Therefore, today’s 57 
firms face the challenging task of determining the appropriate level of disclosure of the risks 58 
and costs associated with GHG emissions. It is no surprise that the question of whether or not 59 
to be green recieves consistently close scrutiny by both the media and scholarly journals 60 
(Hart, 1995; Lam et al., 2016). Event study methodology is widely adopted to address this 61 
question. It does so by quantitatively examining stock market reactions to company 62 
announcements related to environmental initiatives (e.g. Jacobs et al., 2010; Klassen and 63 
McLaughlin, 1996). First introduced by Fama et al. (1969), it has been described as “the 64 
standard method of measuring security price reaction to some announcement or event” 65 
(Binder, 1998, p. 111) indicating that it is highly appropriate for the present study. 66 
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One initiative to meet the need for consistency and transparency is the Carbon Disclosure 67 
Project (CDP).1 The CDP is a charitable organisation concerned with environmental impact 68 
and pursues the goal of spreading environmental risk management and reporting throughout 69 
the business community. Its strategy aims to facilitate investors to move away from 70 
shareholdings bearing risk arising from climate change impacts. The CDP sends companies 71 
listed on major stock indices such as the FTSE350 and S&P500 an annual survey. The survey 72 
gathers information under the following three headings: (a) climate change management: 73 
strategy, initiatives, target, communications, and governance; (b) climate change-related risks 74 
and opportunities; and (c) climate change emissions methodology, emissions performance, 75 
emissions data, and energy and emissions trading. The collected information is made 76 
available to the public via the CDP website. By agreeing to participate in the CDP, firms are 77 
committing to disclosing their existing GHG emission levels, reduction targets, initiatives to 78 
achieve these targets, and associated risks and opportunities arising from global warming 79 
(Lee et al., 2015). The CDP aims to promote investor engagement with companies on 80 
environmental issues and to use their published information to identify opportunities and 81 
reduce risks (CDP, 2020).  82 
The objective of this study is to examine market reaction to CDP survey announcements. 83 
This objective will be achieved by applying the event study method to extend the extant 84 
literature on whether investors see voluntary disclosure of carbon emissions information as 85 
being relevant to stock valuation. The sample comprises 1,564 firm-year observations of 86 
firms listed on the FTSE350 index for the period 2009–2015. This period witnessed 87 
heightened public engagement in climate change issues and the associated policy debate. The 88 
 
1 
Currently the world’s largest register of corporate carbon disclosures, the CDP was established in 2000 in the 
UK. Its central activity is administrating an annual survey on behalf of investor signatories. The CDP survey 
collects information from public companies on climate change-related issues. Its breadth of coverage has also 
led it to become an important data source for academic research. The CDP has highlighted the fact that its data 
was used in 70 peer-reviewed studies published between 2005 and 2015. 
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firms listed on the FTSE350 are the UK’s largest public companies by market capitalisation, 89 
and hence they offer a core representation of the UK’s economic performance and its carbon 90 
strategy.  91 
Earlier studies of market reactions to carbon disclosure have been conducted in the US 92 
context (e.g. Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2011; Hsu and Wang, 2013; Jacobs et al., 2010; 93 
Kim and Lyon, 2011). A smaller number of studies have examined carbon disclosures in 94 
developing countries, typically Asian contexts (e.g. Lam et al., 2016; Lee et al., 2015). 95 
European contexts have received very limited attention regarding market reaction to carbon 96 
disclosures, including the UK. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study 97 
examining the market responses of the London Stock Exchange to announcements related to 98 
carbon disclosure by applying the event study approach. 99 
The UK, as a G7 (Group of Seven) member, is one of the world’s biggest emitters of GHG 100 
(Haque, 2017) making it a pertinent setting for studies of this kind. Moreover, the UK is 101 
currently at the forefront of the development of mechanisms to proactively mitigate the 102 
negative consequences of climate change. Notably, the UK has the greatest proportion of 103 
firms making Scope 1 and 2 emissions disclosures (>97%) and the greatest proportion of 104 
board-level oversight of climate change risk (96%) (CDP, 2018).2 In 2008, The UK’s 105 
Committee on Climate Change gave the government a recommendation to put in place a 106 
GHG reduction target that would see emissions fall to a minimum of 80% of the 1990 levels 107 
by 2050. The following year, the government published voluntary guidelines for measuring 108 
and reporting of GHG emissions to encourage firms in the UK to reduce their climate change 109 
impact. Furthermore, the Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) 110 
Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/1970) brought in statutory requirements for listed companies 111 
 
2Scope 1 emissions are those directly emitted by sources owned or controlled by the reporting firm. Scope 2 
emissions are indirect and represent emissions arising from the generation of energy purchased. 
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regarding GHG emission disclosure. Since 1st October 2013, the firms have been obligated to 112 
publish a directors’ report of GHG emissions and the methodology applied in calculating 113 
them. The UK is, therefore, a highly significant country in terms of both emissions and 114 
emissions disclosure terms. Hence, it is important to remediate the paucity of attention to the 115 
effects of carbon disclosure noticed in the case of this country, which is addressed in the 116 
present study. 117 
Furthermore, we contribute to the continuing literature by constructing the cost-benefit 118 
approach as a conceptual model, to understand market reaction to voluntarily corporate 119 
engagement in climate change initiatives. One proposes that voluntary moves aimed at 120 
improving corporate environmental strategy decrease profits and, therefore, runs counter to 121 
the maximization of shareholder value, a “win-lose” perspective (e.g. Friedman, 1970). On 122 
the other hand, there is another perspective which emphasises that shareholder value and 123 
corporate environmental strategy are not mutually exclusive. Instead, under this view it is 124 
proposed that tackling emissions and achieving profitability can be pursued together, in a 125 
“win-win” approach (e.g. Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). 126 
In the next section, we review existing literature and explain the hypothesis development. 127 
The research design and methodology are explained in the Section 3. The Section 4 presents 128 
the empirical results. Concluding remarks are made in the Section 5. 129 
 130 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 131 
2.1 Background 132 
Researchers have shown considerable interest in the economic consequences of a firm’s 133 
social responsibility (e.g. Clarkson, et al., 2004; Gallego-Álvarez et al., 2015; Hart and 134 
Ahuja, 1996; Hahn and Kühnen, 2013; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Peloza, 2009). Some of the 135 
early literature followed the approach of Friedman’s proposition that the “social 136 
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responsibility of business is to increase its profits” (Friedman, 1970, p. 122) and firmly 137 
positioned corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the cost column. As a cost of doing 138 
business, CSR would inevitably mean lower profits and directly conflict with management’s 139 
obligation to shareholders. For example, a firm contemplating installing new cleaner 140 
production machinery and training staff to use it, both of which would come at a significant 141 
cost requiring new capital. Conversely, another stream of literature challenges Friedman’s 142 
approach by arguing that the twin pursuits of pollution control and profitability are not 143 
necessarily mutually exclusive (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). This approach sees 144 
pollution as a wasteful use of energy and material resources; furthermore, efforts to control 145 
pollution, for example, through improved processes or products, can bring the double benefit 146 
of reducing the firm’s carbon footprint while strengthening its competitiveness. Empirical 147 
studies have produced mixed results when examining carbon performance and disclosure and 148 
firm financial performance although recent meta-analysis found a broadly positive 149 
relationship (Velte et al., 2020).  Studies can be put into one of the following three groups 150 
based on their analytical approach: (a) portfolio analysis, (b) regression analysis, and (c) 151 
event studies.  152 
Studies using the portfolio analysis method aim to examine whether returns for a portfolio 153 
comprising firms with a positive environmental responsibility outperform the market as a 154 
whole. The results have been negative especially for older studies, finding that mutual funds 155 
made up of environmentally or socially responsible firms perform less well in terms of risk-156 
adjusted returns (Geczy et al., 2005; White, 1996). Similarly, Ziegler et al. (2009) reported a 157 
negative abnormal return for investment strategies that involve buying stocks of companies 158 
that are proactively aiming to reduce GHG emissions and divesting stocks where the firms 159 
make no significant investment in environmental efforts. However, a more recent study finds 160 
that investors could gain abnormal risk-adjusted revenues of around 13% annually when 161 
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investing in portfolios entirely comprised of firms which disclose their carbon profile (Liesen 162 
et al., 2017). 163 
Studies using regression analysis focus mainly on the relationship between environmental 164 
responsibility and financial performance over the long term. Several studies have found a 165 
positive relationship. Others, however, reported either mixed findings or a negative 166 
relationship (e.g. Clarkson, et al., 2004; Jaggi and Freedman, 1992; Molloy et al., 2002). 167 
Generally, it appears that a positive relationship is found when the environmental measures 168 
involve compliance, regulatory risk, and liability (Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2011). 169 
Furthermore, Matsumura et al. (2014) reported a significantly negative relationship between 170 
GHG emissions and the value of equity. Their suggestion is attributed to the “uncertainty 171 
surrounding physical climate parameters” as well as to the costs associated with “measuring, 172 
monitoring, and reducing carbon emissions” (Matsumura et al., 2014, p. 701). The 173 
implication of the empirical evidence from these regression studies is that a negative impact 174 
on financial performance should be anticipated from environmental investments (Fisher-175 
Vanden and Thorburn, 2011). It should be noted, however, that the long-term nature of these 176 
studies exposes firm performance to an array of explanatory factors that are beyond 177 
environmental responsibility. 178 
Event study methodology contrasts with regression analysis in ways that suggest it is highly 179 
suitable for capturing market reaction.3 As they focus on market returns, event studies present 180 
a reaction which is based on a forward-looking evaluation of environmental practices and 181 
their financial consequences. Furthermore, event study methodology avoids the endogeneity 182 
issue and offers greater unambiguity regardng the causal direction of the relationship 183 
(Endrikat, 2016).     184 
 
3 In statistical modeling, regression analysis refers to a quantitative tool used to estimate the relationships between 
a dependent variable and one or more independent variables (see Freedman, 2009).   
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Event studies investigate how markets react to environmental 185 
initiatives/disclosures/activities. Although event study methodology has proved to be a 186 
productive approach, the findings have not been consistent, with some results indicating a 187 
positive reaction to environment-related announcements, others a negative reaction, and some 188 
even reporting the absence of any effect. In one of the earlier studies, Shane and Spicer 189 
(1983) reported that the stock market reaction to announcements of improved pollution 190 
performance is more positive than it is for announcements of poor performance. Likewise, 191 
Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) found that positive abnormal stock returns are normally 192 
triggered by positive firm events such as the winning of an environmental award. 193 
Additionally, Griffin and Sun (2013) found that capital markets give a positive response 194 
when firms voluntarily disclose GHG emissions. Contrary to this evidence, other studies 195 
found a different negative reaction to events. For example, when Finnish forestry firms 196 
announce environmental investments, the stock market’s reaction is found to be negative 197 
(Halme and Niskanan, 2001). In the same vein, when studying investor perceptions, Molloy 198 
et al. (2002) found that the perception of environmental investment is that it increases costs, 199 
not reduces them. Moreover, Beatty and Shimshack (2010) reported that stock markets react 200 
to negative environmental disclosures but not to positive ones. Basing his study on the Toxic 201 
Release Inventory’s data releases, Hamilton (1995) found that the public disclosure of these 202 
data and the press coverage thereof leads to significantly negative abnormal returns in cases 203 
where the toxic release was high. Furthermore, Stevens (1984) found that companies whose 204 
pollution control costs are low are more likely to experience positive abnormal stock market 205 
returns when compared to firms incurring high costs. The interpretation of investors is that 206 
the new information increases firm liability or compliance risk, thereby leading to higher 207 
costs. Another event study on ISO 14001 certification announcements reported that the shares 208 
of firms that are relatively less polluting drop post-announcement (Cañón-de-Francia and 209 
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Garcés-Ayerbe, 2009). The interpretation of the authors is that investors see no significant 210 
benefit with such certification, but associate it with high costs. Investors may view firms 211 
asked to make disclosures to the CDP as having potentially high GHG emissions and with 212 
them high mitigation costs. Furthermore, where carbon information is disclosed, there may be 213 
no benefit to investors (Kolk et al., 2008). Mitigation initiatives tend to be related to costs. To 214 
exemplify, the decision to deploy green technologies is associated with an investment that 215 
would be unnecessary if the firm decides not to act as a green firm (Wegener, 2010). Jacobs 216 
et al. (2010) suggested that markets react negatively to voluntary initiatives to reduce 217 
emissions because the associated costs are evident, while the revenue benefits are hard to 218 
define. Consistent with this and other studies, Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011) found that 219 
participation in the Environmental Protection Agency Climate Leaders programme, as a 220 
resource for reducing GHG emissions voluntarily, is linked to a negative market reaction.4 221 
Palmer et al. (1995) argued that shareholders’ wealth is reduced by efforts to mitigate climate 222 
change because such efforts can mean diverting the investment from more productive 223 
activities, and can hence mean that the full potential earnings of its assets are not realised. As 224 
a result, the firm finds itself disadvantaged economically. Alignedwith this argument, Hsu 225 
and Wang (2013) reported that positive wealth effects are associated with firms receiving 226 
negative news coverage regarding climate change. In recent studies, both Chapple et al. 227 
(2013) and Griffin et al. (2017) found that there is a negative relationship between GHG 228 
emissions disclosures to the CDP and shareholder value. They concluded that shareholders 229 
treat carbon emissions as a hidden off-balance sheet liability. In a study closely related to the 230 
present one, Lee et al. (2015) proposed that the stock market would react negatively to a 231 
company’s CDP carbon disclosure based on the fact that such announcements are viewed as 232 
 
4 The Environmental Protection Agency Climate Leaders programme is an American governmental initiative 
aimed at tackling climate change threats and mitigating GHG emissions. 
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bad news that potentially involves costly mitigation measures. Finally, as mentioned, there 233 
are studies reporting no effect. An examination of environmental conscientiousness scores 234 
covered in the press revealed no significant abnormal stock market returns in response 235 
(Yamashita et al., 1999). Similarly, Gilley et al. (2000) reported that the stock market did not 236 
react in any significant way to company announcements on environmental initiatives. This 237 
aligns with Jacobs et al. (2010) who found, among their other findings, that environmental 238 
initiative announcements fail to provoke significant stock market reactions. Kim and Lyon 239 
(2011) also showed a lack of evidence for increases in company value arising from carbon 240 
disclosure. 241 
 242 
 [Figure 1 about here] 243 
 244 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 245 
Stakeholder theory is a popular approach among CSR researchers (Lee et al., 2015). It 246 
emphasises the influence of various stakeholder groups, including investors, employees, 247 
customers, government, and the community, on firm decision making (Freeman, 1984). Since 248 
market reaction is a consequence of investor reaction, our hypothesis is formulated based on 249 
how investors will react to voluntary carbon disclosure announcements initiated by the CDP. 250 
Two main mechanisms have been proposed to examine how CSR either increases revenues or 251 
costs (Friedman, 1970; Porter, and Van der Linde, 1995). A review of these mechanisms 252 
reveals the way voluntary carbon disclosure may impact market reaction.  253 
The framework shown in Figure 1 was used to develop the hypothesised impact of carbon 254 
disclosure announcements on markets. Figure 1 indicates that it is possible that investors’ 255 
perception of the voluntary efforts for carbon disclosure will match Friedman’s perception. 256 
Friedman (1970) proposed that if a firm incurs environmental expenses beyond those 257 
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required for regulatory compliance, then they would be acting against the interests of 258 
shareholders and would see a negative effect on firm value and performance.  259 
Alternatively, as shown in Figure 1, it is also possible for investors to view carbon 260 
disclosures through Porter’s lens. This sees pollution as wasted resources and, therefore, 261 
views mitigation measures and the enhancement of carbon profile as strengthening firm 262 
competitiveness in a win-win situation (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). Furthermore, a 263 
participation in voluntary carbon disclosure will enable a firm to attract and retain high 264 
quality staff (Turban and Greening, 1997), encourage innovation (Surroca et al., 2010), and 265 
improve decision making as well as overall organisational culture (Hillman and Keim, 2001). 266 
In line with stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), it has been argued that companies engaged 267 
in enhancing their environmental responsibility are acquiring both stakeholder support and 268 
necessary resources, which mitigates against legislative, regulatory, or fiscal actions 269 
(Flammer, 2013). In turn, such activities can enhance firm reputation (Hart, 1995), may 270 
manage firm legitimacy (Porter and Kramer, 2006), and reduce financial risks (Peloza, 2009). 271 
It may also attract investment from the growing number of environmentally conscious 272 
investors (Dowell and Hart, 2011). The increased demand from environmentally conscious 273 
consumers can lead to a growth in share prices. Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) suggested 274 
that important reputational benefits emerging from positive environmental actions can be 275 
associated with revenue growth, therefore maximising shareholder wealth by creating 276 
reputational capital. Turning to costs, participation in CDP as an environmental initiative may 277 
help companies achieve cost reductions by reducing pollution and other forms of waste 278 
(Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). Costs may also be lowered by improving energy efficiency 279 
and operational processes (Hart and Ahuja, 1996). This might lead to better employment of 280 
inputs, causing a reduction in raw materials and/or waste disposal expenses. In the long term, 281 
costs related to future environmental crises, regulatory compliance, and liabilities may be 282 
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avoided (Reinhardt, 1999). Furthermore, Albarrak et al. (2019) associate carbon reporting 283 
with a reduced cost of equity. Additionally, when comparing accounting measures with 284 
market measures, Alsaifi et al. (2019) found strong evidence that voluntary carbon disclosure 285 
is more positively associated with the firm’s accounting measures. 286 
It is clear from this discussion that the views of Friedman (1970) and Porter and Van der 287 
Linde (1995) represent two expected outcomes from voluntary carbon disclosure, in terms of 288 
stock market reaction. The former is a negative reaction, and the latter is a positive one. 289 
Therefore, we formulate the following reference hypothesis:  290 
 291 
H1: There is a significant market reaction following the announcement of a CDP survey. 292 
 293 
3. Research Design and Data 294 
3.1 Sample 295 
Since the FTSE350 is the largest index in the UK that is annually assessed by the CDP, all 296 
firms continually listed on the FTSE350 between 2009 and 2015 were included in the sample. 297 
It is noteworthy that FTSE350 firms were originally asked in 2006 to engage with and report 298 
their carbon footprint voluntarily via the CDP online survey.5 This first year, however, was not 299 
used for our analysis because (1) there was only a low level of participation in the CDP, and 300 
(2) the qualitative analysis only extended to assigning responses to one of the following four 301 
categories: Answered Questionnaire (AQ), Provided Information (IN), Declined to Participate 302 
(DP), and No Response (NR). From the following year, a 0 to 100 scoring scale was introduced. 303 
Notwithstanding this change, we also decided to exclude the period 2007-2008 to isolate our 304 
analysis from the effects of the global financial crisis (GFC). However, we will consider this 305 
 
5 The CDP reporting year is set to match the fiscal year of each participating firm. Subsequently, the summary 
of survey data is generally published in September or October of the reporting year. 
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impact in the additional analysis section. We had intended to continue the sample period 306 
beyond 2015. However, the CDP report for 2016 announced a substantial revision to the 307 
methods used to calculate firms’ CDS. By including further years consistency of data would 308 
have been lost. The report advises, “It is important to note that the 2016 scoring approach is 309 
fundamentally different from 2015, and different information is requested, so 2015 and 2016 310 
scores are not directly comparable” (CDP, 2016, p.11). 311 
Following standard practice for research of this kind, financial institutions were also excluded 312 
because of their unique accounting principles and the different social and environmental 313 
guidelines they apply, such as the ‘Equator Principles’ (e.g Alsaifi et al., 2019; Haque, 314 
2017).6 Ultimately, the sample comprised of 1,564 firm-year observations crossing nine 315 
industries. The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) used for the CDP sector 316 
categories is also applied to this study. A summary of the final sample distribution by 317 
industry and year is given in Table 1 Panel A which indicates 2014 as the highest year for 318 
response rate (79%) and 2009 as the lowest (57%) in the sampled period. Despite the 319 
surprising drop in 2015, it is clear that the annual increase in the response rate is consistent 320 
with public concern related to climate change. Panel B shows that the utilities industry has 321 
the highest overall response rate (93%), while the technology industry has the lowest (52%). 322 
Based on the FTSE All-Share Index classification, this study indicates that the response rate 323 
for firms operating in carbon-intensive industries (72%) is almost equal to the response rate 324 
for firms in non-intensive industries (71.25%).7 It had been posited that firms in polluting 325 
sectors were more likely to make voluntary environmental disclosures (Brammer and 326 
Pavelin, 2006). However, in the present study, and in line with Stanny and Ely (2008), we 327 
 
6 The Equator Principles offer financial institutions a risk management framework aimed at providing a 
minimum standard for determining, assessing, and managing environmental and social risks in projects. See: 
http://www.equator-principles.com. 
7 FTSE All-Share Index standards are applied to identify carbon-intensive industries based on the level and 
nature of GHG emissions. These were industrials, basic materials, utilities, consumer services, and oil and gas. 
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find no evidence of this, suggesting that carbon-intensive industries have decreased or failed 328 
to increase their disclosures while non-intensive industries have become increasingly 329 




[Table 1 about here] 334 
3.2 Event Study 335 
The market reaction following announcements in the CDP report is estimated by using the 336 
event study method, thereby testing the hypothesis. This method provides the means (when 337 
applying T-test) or medians (when applying Wilcoxon signed-rank test) to estimate event-338 
related market returns and, at the same time, control for more general market influences on 339 
stock prices (Bash and Alsaifi, 2019; MacKinlay, 1997). The underlying assumption is that, 340 
in conditions of market efficiency, an event’s effect is reflected immediately in the stock 341 
price of the concerned firm. Consequently, by observing the stock price for a short time span, 342 
event effects on a firm’s value can be recorded (Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2011).  343 
The initial task when implementing the event study is to determine the event period, this 344 
being the period for estimating abnormal returns. To encompass the possibility of pre-345 
announcement information leakage, the day prior to the announcement is included in addition 346 
to the announcement day itself (Lam et al., 2016). For this reason, and to align with previous 347 
event studies (Ba et al., 2013; Lam et al., 2016; Wassmer et al., 2014), we selected three days 348 
around the event dates as our main event window (i.e. days -1 to +1). This procedure would 349 
help us to account for the possibility of pre-event information leakages and the possibility of 350 
announcements being made after stock market closures. Further extension of the window 351 
would open up the possibility of market movements not being attributable to the particular 352 
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event (Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2011). Calendar days are converted to event days by 353 
designating the announcement day as Day 0. If the announcement is made on a non-trading 354 
day or later than 4.30 pm London time of a trading day, then Day 0 would become the 355 
following day. All other trading days are recorded as relative to Day 0; hence, the trading day 356 
prior to Day 0 (announcement day) is recorded as Day -1. Likewise, the trading day 357 
immediately after the announcement day is designated Day +1. Additionally, aligning with 358 
previous studies, the estimation of abnormal returns is conducted using the market model 359 
(e.g. Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2011; Jacobs et al., 2010; Wassmer et al., 2014).  360 
Under this model, a linear relationship is posited between a given stock’s return and the 361 
market return (the return on the market portfolio) over a specified period of time:  362 
 363 
𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖  +  𝛽𝑖 𝑅𝑚𝑡 + ℇ𝑖𝑡                                                                  (1) 364 
 365 
whereby 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡  represents the expected return of stock i on Day t, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 represents the market 366 
return on Day t, 𝑎𝑖  is the intercept of the relationship for stock i, and 𝛽𝑖 is the slope of the 367 
relationship for stock i regarding the market return, with ℇ𝑖𝑡  being the error term for stock i on 368 
Day t. The term 𝛽𝑖 𝑅𝑚𝑡 represents the sensitivity of stock i’s returns to market return. This 369 
portion of the return for which market movements provide no explanation is represented by 370 
the error term ℇ𝑖𝑡, which captures the effects of the firm-specific information released. The 371 
computation of expected return for each firm in the sample is estimated in accordance with 372 
Equation (1), where 𝑎𝑖 and  𝛽𝑖 are estimated by applying the ordinary least squares regression 373 
across the 200-trading-day estimation period. The commencement of the estimation period 374 
was designated, with Day -200 being the first trading day of the year, and terminated on Day 375 
-21. The reason for terminating the estimation period 21 days before the event day is to 376 
protect the estimates from contamination due to the impacts of the announcement and to 377 
 17 
render any stationarity inconsequential. In cases where a firm does not have data available for 378 
the entire estimation period, a qualifying minimum of 40 stock returns during the 200-day 379 
period was applied to the estimates in Equation (1). 380 
Next, the computation of the abnormal return for firm i on Day t, which is the difference 381 
between the actual and the expected return, goes as follows:  382 
 383 
   𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡                                                                                       (2) 384 
 385 
whereby 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is equal to the abnormal return on security i on date t, 𝑅𝑖𝑡  represents the actual 386 
return of stock i on Day t, and 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡  represents the expected return of stock i on Day t. 387 
After this, aligning with previous event studies (e.g. Gilley et al., 2000; Jacobs et al., 2010; 388 
Lam et al., 2016), the data is both parametrically and non-parametrically tested. First, for 389 
testing the data parametrically, we use the t-test to determine the statistical significance of the 390 
mean of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Second, for testing the data non-391 
parametrically, we control for the effect of outliers using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, 392 
which determines the statistical significance of the median of CARs.8 Finally, the CARs are 393 
computed by cumulating ARs over the announcement period. 394 
 395 
  𝐶𝐴𝑅 [𝑡1, 𝑡2] = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
                                                                                          (3) 396 
 397 
 
8 Since the study’s observations are not normally distributed on the basis of a Sapiro-Francia normality test, the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank non-parametric statistical test is prioritized for explaining the results (McDonald, 
2009). Therefore, if the results of these two tests (t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test) are inconsistent, we 
consider the Wilcoxon signed-rank results. 
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whereby 𝐶𝐴𝑅 is the cumulative abnormal return, t is the selected day related to the 398 
announcement event and 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal return on security i on date t. 399 
 400 
4. Results and Analysis 401 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 402 
Descriptive statistics of the sample use data from the fiscal year immediately prior to the 403 
most recent announcement, and are shown in Table 2. The averages of firms’ market value 404 
and total assets are £9.7 and £8.8 billion, respectively, which suggests that our sample 405 
comprises large firms. While there is broad variation in firm characteristics found in the 406 
sample, there is an overall weighting towards the London Stock Exchange’s largest firms by 407 
market capitalisation.  408 
 409 
[Table 2 about here] 410 
 411 
 412 
4.2 Market Reaction to CDP Announcements 413 
Table 3 (Panel A) shows how markets reacted to announcements from companies 414 
participating in the CDP report; additionally, the t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test results 415 
of ARs and CARs are presented. The ARs on Day -1 are not statistically significant for both 416 
the t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test, indicating an absence of evidence of information 417 
leakage prior to CDP announcements. Furthermore, the median of ARs on day 0 is 418 
significantly negative on the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. A subsequent checking of CARs 419 
periods reveals evidence that responses from capital markets had a significantly negative 420 
relationship with the voluntary carbon information disclosure for various lengths of the event 421 
window. Notably, the mean (median) of CARs over the two-day window (0 to +1) and for the 422 
key three-day event window (-1 to +1) are statistically negatively significant at the 5% and 423 
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10% levels, respectively, for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, which indicates that investors 424 
respond negatively to the CDP announcements of FTSE350 firms. This could be ascribed to 425 
the fact that investors interpret climate-related environmental initiatives as an investment/cost 426 
to the company without an offsetting benefit, that reduces competitive advantage, which 427 
aligns with the conclusions of Cañón-de-Francia and Garcés-Ayerbe (2009). It would also 428 
align with Hsu and Wang’s (2013) findings that, generally, investors hold the belief that 429 
when firms tackle climate change, it can increase costs and place firms at an economic 430 
disadvantage. In other words, voluntary carbon disclosure requires additional costs that 431 
reduce the attractiveness of investment in the firm, which may lead investors to abandon the 432 
firm's stock even at low prices. Therefore, H1 is supported, and London Stock Exchange 433 
investors’ reaction is consistent with Friedman’s (1970) view that expenses incurred for 434 
environmental purposes, which fall outside of regulatory compliance, run counter to the best 435 
interests of shareholders and degrade firm value. Conversely, market reactions to CDP’s non-436 
participants, shown in Panel B of Table 3, were not significant, particularly for the key event 437 
window (-1 to +1), with the exception of Day 0 that is negatively significant in the Wilcoxon 438 
signed-rank test.  439 
 440 
[Table 3 about here] 441 
 442 
 443 
The explanation of our findings is that participation in the CDP survey is perceived as leading 444 
to extra costs from the investors’ perspective. The robustness of the main results presented in 445 
Table 3 are inducted on firms participating in the CDP and working in carbon-intensive 446 
industries. For such firms,  there is a greater likelihood of significant costs being incurred in 447 
relation to environmental protection, including risk management, clean-up costs, and 448 
reporting and compliance costs (Nguyen, 2018). For this, we divide the firms participating in 449 
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the CDP survey into ten industries (nine after excluding the financial industry) based on 450 
GICS classification.  451 
We then apply FTSE All-Share Index standards to identify carbon-intensive industries within 452 
the subsample of firms that participated in the CDP survey (1,100 observations). These were 453 
found to be consumer services, basic materials, industrials, utilities, and oil and gas. Panel A 454 
in Table 4 indicates that investors react to CDP announcements for firms working in carbon-455 
intensive industries in a significantly negative way at the 5% level. This response occurs in 456 
almost all window periods, particularly in the key event window (-1 to +1) and on the 457 
announcement day itself (Day 0). The mean and median results of ARs and CARs for these 458 
and other periods support the notion that investors' impressions of participation in measures 459 
to tackle climate change and voluntary carbon disclosure initiatives are a cost on firms. This 460 
finding is aligned with Chapple et al. (2013) who also found that the market evaluates the 461 
most carbon-intensive firms in the sample more negatively than other firms. These investors' 462 
reactions reflect the expectation that environment-related costs will increase, creating 463 
negative financial consequences; an expectation that is even more pronounced for firms in 464 
carbon-intensive industries (Ramiah et al., 2013). These cost consequences may be carbon-465 
related management and accounting costs, clean-up costs, litigation and compliance costs or 466 
reputational damage costs. For firms working in non-intensive industries (Panel B), although 467 
there are significant positive reactions through t-test on the announcement day (day 0) and for 468 
the event window of (-1 to 0), we were unable to confirm these results since the test of 469 
Wilcoxon signed-rank has insignificant signs.  470 
 471 
[Table 4 about here] 472 
 473 
 21 
4.3 Additional Analyses 474 
While the FTSE 350 comprises the UK’s largest publicly listed firms there is considerable 475 
range of firm size among them. Therefore, to examine the effect of firm size on market 476 
reaction we grouped participating firms into one of two groups based on whether their market 477 
capitalization was higher or lower than the mean market capitalization (£12.55 billion for 478 
participated firms). In Table 5 the higher market capitalization group (Panel A) shows no 479 
significant market reaction. In contrast, the group of smaller market capitalization firms 480 
(Panel B) indicates significant negative market reaction on day 0 and in the key period which 481 
is confirmed by Wilcoxon signed-rank test or T-test. This further finding suggests that the 482 
earlier main findings are driven by the smaller firms listed on the FTSE 350. The firm size 483 
effect may be explained by investors perceiving that for smaller firms’ investment in 484 
environmental initiatives is not a priority. Moreover, investors may also perceive that larger 485 
firms are in a better position to absorb environmental costs than their smaller counterparts 486 
(Jaggi et al., 2018; Stanny and Ely, 2008).9   487 
 488 
 489 
 [Table 5 about here] 490 
 491 
To examine the impact of the GFC period, we apply the same criteria as for the main sample, 492 
but change the period from 2009-2015 to 2007-2008, and the total observations for the new 493 
sample becomes 455.10 Table 6 (Panel A) shows the market responses for companies 494 
participating in CDP announcements during the crisis period. The results through the two 495 
tests (i.e. t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test) over several event window periods, including 496 
 
9 We would like to acknowledge the anonymous reviewer who attracts our attention to this additional analysis 
10 Consistent with Erkens et al., 2012, we specify the years of 2007-2008 as the GFC period. 
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the key period (i.e. -1, +1), show a significant positive market reaction. This finding can be 497 
explained as an investor perception of the CDP announcement as a signal of the financial 498 
strength of the participating firms. This perception is based on the view that firms that 499 
participated in CDP during the GFC are confident of their financial situation. This is 500 
demonstrated by their allocation of financial resources to non-profit social initiatives, such as 501 
voluntarily disclosure of their carbon profile through the CDP report. This finding is 502 
supportive of Mohr et al., (2001) who argue that investment in CSR should be maintained 503 
during economic crises as it exerts a positive influence on stakeholder behavior. Similarly, 504 
Gallego‐Álvarez et al., (2014) state that CSR is required in times of financial crises to induce 505 
greater trust in the business. The results of non-CDP participants for the 2007-2008 period, as 506 
presented in Panel B of Table 6, shows that while market responses are inconsistent through 507 
ARs and CARs periods, for the key period (i.e. -1, +1) reactions are insignificant. Having 508 
said that, the market would not react positively or negatively for firms that do not disclose 509 
their carbon profile during the GFC period but will reward firms that disclose their carbon 510 
profile during the GFC period. 511 
 512 
[Table 6 about here] 513 
 514 
5. Conclusion 515 
Climate change has become a major issue in corporate decision making and poses a challenge 516 
to corporate leadership. There is increasing pressure for businesses to operate in a climate-517 
friendly way, but a potential conflict may arise when such a strategy contradicts the pursuit of 518 
shareholder value. Empirical studies have produced mixed results when examining the issue 519 
of CSR and firm’s financial consequences. Our study set out to understand the market 520 
reaction to carbon disclosures for the UK context. To this end, a conceptual model was 521 
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applied which explains the market reactions, negative or positive (i.e. Friedman, 1970; Porter 522 
and Van der Linde, 1995). In line with this model, we hypothesize that there would be a 523 
significant market reaction, either positive or negative, following the announcement of 524 
voluntary carbon disclosure via the CDP survey. The study uses an event study approach and 525 
a data set of 1,564 firm-year observations of large firms listed on the FTSE350 index for the 526 
period 2009-2015. In addition, two subsamples were analyzed, one based on industry status 527 
(carbon-intensive/non-carbon-intensive) for CDP participating firms, and another that 528 
included a sample for the GFC period 2007-2008. 529 
For the main sample, our analysis showed a statistically significant negative market reaction 530 
to carbon disclosure announcements of FTSE350 firms. This suggests that investors perceive 531 
such disclosures to be associated with climate-related environmental investments, 532 
representing costs that are not perceived to be offset by tangible benefits and that weaken 533 
competitive advantage. This result supports the win-lose view that any costs incurred beyond 534 
regulatory compliance is against the interests of shareholders and would have a negative 535 
effect on firm value (Friedman, 1970). For the industry status subsample, our results also 536 
show that investors in firms operated in carbon-intensive industries react to carbon disclosure 537 
announcements in a significantly negative way. This result also supports the expectation that 538 
firms operating in carbon-intensive industries experience a more pronounced negative 539 
reaction on voluntary carbon disclosure. Dividing the sample into two groups based on 540 
market capitalization indicates that the significant negative market reaction result was driven 541 
by the smaller firm group. For the temporal subsample (2007-2008), carbon disclosure 542 
announcements are associated with a significantly positive market reaction. We conjecture 543 
that this may be explained as an investor perception of the carbon disclosure announcement 544 
in the crisis period as a signal of the financial robustness of participating firms, though this 545 
 24 
explanation does not necessarily align with Porter and Van der Linde (1995) and their win-546 
win approach. 547 
Hence, overall, we can conclude that, in the case of the London Stock Exchange’s investors, 548 
voluntary carbon disclosures are deemed to have a negative value as they signal directly 549 
assignable associated costs that are not matched by tangible financial benefits. The exception 550 
to this was the 2007-2008 crisis period.  551 
5.1 Implications for theory and practice 552 
This study considered two contrasting theoretical approaches to firm sustainability and 553 
broader CSR, those of Friedman and Porter. While there is some evidence that carbon 554 
disclosure may be positively related to financial performance (Matsumura et al., 2013; Saka 555 
and Oshika, 2014) our study suggests that at the level of perception the market reaction is 556 
negative. This result could be associated theoretically with Friedman’s (1970) assertion that 557 
incurring non-mandatory environmental expenses is against shareholders’ interests. The 558 
study adds to the literature which suggests a mismatch between the immediate market 559 
reaction and accounting-based measures of the effect of carbon reporting (Alsaifi et al., 2019; 560 
Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Peloza, 2009).  561 
In practical terms, our study’s finding leads to the implication that more emphasis needs to be 562 
placed by management on identifying and justifying firms’ environmental strategies and the 563 
resultant initiatives including investments in cleaner production. Carbon disclosures should 564 
be accompanied by these clarifications, and expressions of the resultant value should be as 565 
tangible as possible. The potential for waste reduction and lower costs through energy 566 
efficient cleaner production are tangible benefits from environmental initiatives and while not 567 
all sustainability investments are so direct in their cost-benefit impact improved messaging 568 
could alter investors’ perceptions. Future research may consider the scores of voluntary 569 
carbon disclosure for the firms included in the CDP report as a possible factor in the market 570 
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reaction toward climate change initiatives. This could be achieved by controlling the 571 
disclosure score as a piece of good news for firms with a high disclosure score and bad news 572 
for firms with a low disclosure score. Moreover, using carbon disclosures data from a 573 
different source to the CDP would add to the present study and the empirical robustness of its 574 
findings. Finally, market reaction to mandatory carbon disclosure announcements could be 575 
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Table 1 857 
                              Participated Firms Non-Participated Firms Total Response Rate % 
Panel A: Sample Structure and Response Rates by Year 
2009 130 100 230 57% 
2010 137 87 224 61% 
2011 156 74 230 68% 
2012 163 47 210 78% 
2013 176 53 229 77% 
2014 171 45 216 79% 
2015 167 58 225 74% 
N 1,100 464 1,564  
Panel B: Sample Structure and Response Rates by Industry 
Basic Materials 102 61 163 63% 
Consumer Goods 155 33 188 82% 
Consumer Services 266 145 411 65% 
Health Care 54 20 74 73% 
Industrials 311 107 418 74% 
Oil and Gas 79 43 122 65% 
Technology 45 41 86 52% 
Telecommunications 36 10 46 78% 
Utilities 52 4 56 93% 
N 1,100 464 1,564  








Table 2 865 
 Market Value (£M) Total Assets (£M) Sales (£M) Net Income (£M) Employees 
Mean 9,776.55 8,835.48 7,875.15 593.31 26,643.69 
Median 1,961.40 1,660.80 1,425.33 108.58 8,354.50 
SD 23,582.01 26,594.06 28,930.35 1,789.27 61,447.96 
Max 143,951.20 226,632.40 298,487.50 17,374.88 648,254 
Min 242.63 38.54 0.29 -274.56 8 



















  884 
Table 3 885 
Panel A: Participated Firms 
Day N Mean  Median  t-Test Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Abnormal Return (ARs) 
-1 1100 -0.018% -0.018% -0.378 -0.755 
0 1100 -0.054% -0.095% -1.030 -2.483** 
+1 1100 -0.045% -0.061% -0.804 -0.948 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CARs) 
-1, 0 1100 -0.072% -0.115% -1.103 -2.092** 
0, +1 1100 -0.098% -0.144% -1.326* -2.156** 
-1, +1 1100 -0.122% -0.202% -1.351* -1.798* 
Panel B: Non-Participated Firms 
Day N Mean  Median  t-Test Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Abnormal Return (ARs) 
-1 464  0.120% -0.142%  1.301 -0.636 
0 464 -0.178%  0.109% -1.867 -2.195** 
+1 464  0.096%  0.062%  1.060  1.334 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CARs) 
-1, 0 464 -0.072% -0.115% -0.453 -0.782 
0, +1 464 -0.058% -0.221% -0.634 -0.583 
-1, +1 464 -0.050%  0.154% -0.295 -0.632 
 This table reports the market reaction for participated and non-participated firms in CDP, based on our 886 
sample for the period 2009 to 2015, comprising 1,564 firm-year observations. * p<10% (one-tailed tests), 887 







Table 4 894 
Panel A: Intensive Industries 
Day N Mean  Median  t-Test Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Abnormal Return (ARs) 
-1 810 -0.023% -0.036% -0.4258 -1.099 
0 810 -0.136% -0.129% -2.313** -3.169*** 
1 810 -0.041% -0.053% -0.581 -0.268 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CARs) 
-1, 0 810 -0.159% -0.171% -2.116** -2.116** 
0, +1 810 -0.176% -0.161% -2.001** -2.347** 
-1, +1 810 -0.198% -0.266% -1.812** -2.089** 
Panel B: Non-Intensive Industries 
Day N Mean  Median  t-Test Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Abnormal Return (ARs) 
-1 290 -0.003%  0.022% -0.033 0.384 
0 290  0.175%  0.019%  1.575* 0.431 
1 290 -0.056% -0.118% -0.702 -1.458 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CARs) 
-1, 0 290  0.171%  0.082% 1.322* 1.065 
0, +1 290  0.119% -0.079% 0.869 -0.239 
-1, +1 290  0.089% -0.038% 0.562 0.009 
This table reports the market reaction for participated firms in CDP for intensive and non-intensive 895 
industries, based on firms participated in CDP from our sample for the period of 2009 to 2015, 896 
comprising 1,100 firm-year observations. * p<10% (one-tailed tests), ** p<5% (one-tailed tests), and 897 






Table 5 903 
Panel A: Higher Market Capitalization  
Day N Mean  Median  t-Test Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Abnormal Return (ARs) 
-1 213 -0.017% -0.012% -0.178 -0.360 
0 213 -0.093% -0.060% -0.875 -1.400 
+1 213  0.063% -0.072% 0.793 -0.186 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CARs) 
-1, 0 213  -0.110% -0.114% -0.855 -1.163 
0, +1 213  -0.030% -0.206%  -0.233  -1.376 
-1, +1 213  -0.051% -0.148%  -0.340  -1.083 
Panel B: Lower Market Capitalization 
Day                    N                      Mean                  Median            t-Test             Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Abnormal Return (ARs)    
-1 887 -0.018% -0.021% -0.335 -0.664 
0 887 -0.044% -0.115% -0.746 -2.050** 
+1 887 -0.070% -0.060% -1.064 -1.003 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CARs) 
-1, 0 887 -0.063% -0.115% -0.839 -1.764* 
0, +1 887 -0.115% -0.130% -1.325* -1.782* 
-1, +1 887 -0.139% -0.226% -1.311* -1.530 
This table reports the market reaction for participated firms in CDP based on their market capitalization mean 904 
(£12.55 billion), for the period of 2009 to 2015, comprising 1,100 firm-year observations. * p<10% (one-tailed 905 







Table 6 912 
Panel A: Participated Firms 
Day N Mean  Median t-Test Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Abnormal Return (ARs) 
-1 181 0.128% 0.166% 0.528 0.665 
0 181 0.598% -0.327% 1.569* -0.098 
+1 181 0.465% 0.354% 1.670** 1.674* 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CARs) 
-1, 0 181 0.725% 0.036% 1.706** 0.849 
0, +1 181 1.063% 0.358% 2.381*** 1.881* 
-1, +1 181 1.191% 0.183% 2.606*** 1.918* 
Panel B: Non-Participated Firms 
Day N  Mean  Median  t-Test Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Abnormal Return (ARs) 
-1 274  -0.305% -0.0503% -1.823** -1.046 
0 274  -0.234% -0.446% -0.972 -2.480** 
+1 274   0.890%  0.535%  5.215***  4.998*** 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CARs) 
-1, 0 274  -0.540% -0.314% -1.746** -1.849* 
0, +1 274   0.655%  0.201%  2.573***  1.851* 
-1, +1 274   0.350% -0.053%  1.1489  0.915 
This table reports market reaction for participated and non-participated firms in CDP for crisis period, 913 
based on our sample for the crisis period of 2007-2008, comprising 455 firm-year observations. * p<10% 914 
(one-tailed tests), ** p<5% (one-tailed tests), and *** p<1% (one-tailed tests). 915 
 916 
 917 
